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International Technology Transfer
for Climate Policy
Introduction
While the developed world is starting to limit emissions of greenhouse 
gases, emissions from the developing world are increasing as a result 
of economic growth. Reducing these emissions while still enabling 
developing countries to grow requires the use of new technologies. In 
most cases, these technologies are first created in high-income countries. 
Thus, the challenge for climate policy is to encourage the transfer of 
these climate-friendly technologies to the developing world. 
This policy brief reviews the economic literature on environmental 
technology transfer. It then discuss the implications of this literature 
for climate policy, focusing on the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. It concludes by asking whether the current 
structure of the CDM provides sufficient incentives for technology 
transfer. Are CDM projects providing real emissions reductions, or 
are developed countries simply receiving credit for reductions that 
developing countries could have achieved on their own? What lessons 
can we learn from recent experience that may guide the development 
of the CDM (or other similar policy tools) during the next round of 
international climate policy negotiations? 
Global Warming and the Kyoto Protocol
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) are the gases present in the earth’s atmosphere 
that reduce the loss of heat into outer space. Strong scientific evidence 
indicates that excess GHGs trap heat and raise the temperature of the 
earth’s atmosphere to a level that causes undesirable climate changes. 
The most important greenhouse gases include water vapor, carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane, and ozone. While many natural processes 
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produce GHGs, most scientists agree that anthropogenic (human) 
activity, particularly burning carbon-based fossil fuels, has increased 
the concentration of CO2 and some other GHGs since the Industrial 
Revolution began in the mid-1700s. Although it is not easy to know 
precisely how long it takes GHGs to leave the atmosphere, most take 
several years.
The international response to climate change began at the Earth Summit 
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, where more than 150 countries signed the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, a non-binding agreement to 
stabilize GHG emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.
Subsequently, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol set binding targets on 37 
industrialized countries and the European Community to reduce 
emissions 5.2 percent below 1990 levels by 2012. Since most 
anthropogenic GHGs were created during the past 150 years of 
industrial activity by developed countries, the Protocol placed a greater 
responsibility on those countries to reduce GHG emissions. The Protocol 
legally entered into force on February 16, 2005, and has been ratified by 
180 countries to date.
The Kyoto Protocol provides three market-based “flexibility 
mechanisms” to help countries meet their GHG emission targets.
Emissions Trading •  allows countries that have more emission units 
than they need to sell the excess units (called assigned amount units, or 
AAUs) to countries that are over their targets. A new commodity has 
been created in the form of emission reductions or removals, known 
simply as the carbon market. These transactions take place between 
Annex I countries (developed and transitioning countries that have 
ratified the Protocol; see Appendix for a list of Annex I countries).
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) •  allows Annex I countries 
with emission constraints to receive credit toward their own country’s 
emissions reduction target by investing in projects that reduce emissions 
in developing countries that do not face emission constraints. Developed 
countries can thus reach their emission targets at a lower cost to 
themselves by substituting emissions reduction projects in developing 
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countries, where costs are lower, for more expensive projects in the home 
country.
Joint Implementation (JI) •  enables any Annex I country to meet 
its emissions reduction commitment by investing in a project in any 
other Annex I country as an alternative to reducing emissions in their 
own country. In practice, most JI projects are expected to take place in 
transitioning Annex I countries, where costs are lower.
Recent rapid economic growth of countries such as China and India 
brings the promise of a better life to much of the world’s population. 
However, with growth comes pollution, particularly greenhouse gas 
emissions such as carbon dioxide that lead to climate change. The need 
to reduce global CO2 emissions comes at a time when the share of 
emissions coming from developing countries is growing. From 2003 
to 2004, CO2 emissions from developed countries that are members of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
grew by less than 2 percent, while those from non-OECD countries grew 
by nearly 10 percent. Energy-related CO2 emissions from non-OECD 
countries exceeded those from OECD countries for the first time in 2004 
(Energy Information Administration 2007). Much of this increase can 
be attributed to economic growth in China and India. In 1990, these two 
countries accounted for 13 percent of world CO2 emissions. By 2004, 
that figure had risen to 22 percent, and it is projected to rise to 31 percent 
by 2030.
But CO2 persists in the atmosphere for hundreds of years, and developed 
countries are responsible for nearly all of the increase in carbon 
concentrations that has occurred since the Industrial Revolution. Through 
the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” the Kyoto 
Protocol places the burden of reducing carbon emissions on those 
countries responsible. Although the United States has not ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol, other Annex I nations have, and plans to reduce CO2 
emissions have been introduced in many of these countries.
During negotiations for the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, emissions 
from developing countries will receive increased attention. Indeed, one 
of the primary objections of US policymakers to Kyoto is the lack of 
reduction commitments for developing countries. However, forcing 
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mandatory emissions limits on developing countries will be difficult 
because they also face internal pressures to develop and modernize their 
economies and provide a higher standard of living for their citizens. 
Burning fossil fuels, the main source of GHG emissions, increases as a 
country’s economy grows.
Developing and Transferring New Technologies
Reducing GHG emissions while accommodating both economic growth 
and population growth depends on one of two strategies (Holden 2006). 
Reduce the •  carbon intensity of energy use (that is, the amount of 
carbon emitted per unit of energy consumed). This ratio has been falling 
over time, as the deployment of cleaner energy sources such as natural 
gas and wind increases. However, this will be a particular challenge in 
China, which currently receives about 68 percent of its energy from coal, 
the most carbon intensive of the fossil fuels (Yardley and Revkin 2007).
Reduce  • energy intensity (energy usage per dollar of GDP) by 
improving energy efficiency. More efficient technologies enable a 
country to achieve greater economic output from a given amount of 
energy. 
Both strategies require developing new and improved technologies, 
and then transferring them from developed to developing countries. 
Most technological innovation currently takes place within a few highly 
developed economies. In 2000, global research and development (R&D) 
expenditures were at least $729 billion. More than 80 percent of this 
R&D was conducted in the OECD, half by the United States and Japan 
alone (National Science Board 2006). Thus, an important question for 
policymakers as they negotiate a successor to Kyoto is how to encourage 
the development and deployment of energy efficiency and alternative 
energy technologies in the developing world. 
Although the Kyoto Protocol does not impose binding emissions 
reductions on developing countries, it offers the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) as a means by which developed nations can help 
developing countries reduce their emissions. Under the Kyoto Protocol, 
reducing GHG emissions (which are measured in millions of tons of CO2 
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equivalent) by means of CDM projects has grown from just under 100 
million tons in 2004 to nearly 550 million tons in 2007. As expected, 
given the European Union’s active role in reducing CO2 emissions, most 
of the investors are European countries, which sponsored 87 percent 
of CDM and Joint Implementation projects, with Japan accounting for 
another 11 percent (Capoor and Ambrosi, various years).
Technological Change and the Environment: Theory and Evidence
Technological change proceeds in three stages. At each stage, incentives 
in the form of prices or regulations affect the development and adoption 
of new technologies. Joseph Schumpeter (1942) described the process of 
technological change as one of “creative destruction”:
Invention: •  an idea must be born.
Innovation:  • new ideas are then developed into commercially viable 
products. Often, these two stages of technological change are lumped 
together under the rubric of research and development (R&D).
Diffusion: •  to have an effect on the economy, individuals must choose 
to make use of the innovation. 
Market Failures in Research & Development
At all three stages, market forces provide insufficient incentives for 
investment in either the development or diffusion of environmentally-
friendly technologies. Economists point to two market failures as the 
explanations for underinvestment in environmental R&D. 
One is the traditional problem of environmental externalities. Because 
carbon emissions created in the production of a product are not normally 
included in the price of the product, neither firms nor consumers have 
any incentive to reduce emissions on their own. Thus, the market for 
technologies that reduce emissions is limited, which in turn reduces the 
incentives to develop such technologies. However, even in the absence 
of policy interventions, there will likely be some incentives to develop 
technologies that reduce carbon emissions. Such technologies may come 
with private benefits—for example, reduced gasoline expenditures from 
switching to a hybrid-powered automobile. The market failure problem 
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simply means that individuals do not consider the social benefits of using 
technologies that reduce emissions.
The second market failure pertaining to R&D is the public goods nature 
of knowledge (see, for example, Geroski 1995). In most cases, new 
technologies must be made available to the public for the inventor to 
reap the rewards of invention. However, when this happens, some or all 
of the knowledge embodied in the invention also becomes available to 
the public. This public knowledge may lead to knowledge spillovers—
additional innovations, or even copies of the current innovations, which 
provide benefits to the public as a whole but not to the innovator. As 
a result, private firms do not have incentives to provide the socially 
optimal level of research activity.
The technological innovations discussed in this brief will typically 
include knowledge spillovers, as it is nearly impossible for the firm 
transferring a technology to be fully compensated for the enhanced 
productivity the recipient will enjoy when employing the newly-received 
skills in future projects. Because firms cannot be fully compensated for 
these knowledge spillovers, climate-friendly R&D will be underprovided 
by market forces even if policies to correct the environmental 
externalities of emissions, such as carbon taxes, are in place.
Current Findings for Environmentally-Friendly Innovation
Nearly all of the world’s R&D is performed in the developed  •
OECD economies, so their climate policies usually shape the 
development of climate-friendly technologies.
Lanjouw and Mody (1996) study technological change for a variety of 
environmentally-friendly technologies, using patent data from the US, 
Japan, Germany, and 14 low- and middle-income countries. They find 
that such innovation increases as pollution abatement expenditures in the 
country increase. For the US, Japan, and Germany, the majority of these 
patents are typically domestic patents. In contrast, for the developing 
countries, the majority of these patents come from foreign countries. 
This is especially true of air pollution control technologies, which are 
typically complex. Water pollution control technologies, on the other 
hand, are more frequently local innovations, as local conditions shape the 
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requirements of these technologies, and they are less likely to be patented 
elsewhere. 
Policies in one nation may affect innovation of technologies in a  •
second nation. 
For example, the United States was the first country to adopt strict 
automobile emissions standards, but the majority of vehicle air emissions 
patents granted in the US are from foreign nations (Lanjouw and Mody 
1996). Korean automotive manufacturers first incorporated advanced 
emission controls into their vehicles to satisfy regulatory requirements 
in the US and Japanese markets (Medhi 2008), and only later did the 
Korean government pass their own regulations requiring advanced 
emission controls.
However, inventers of air pollution control technologies for coal-fired 
electric power plants in the US, Japan, and Germany respond primarily to 
domestic regulatory incentives (Popp 2006). In each country, the largest 
increase in domestic patent applications occurs after the country passes 
regulations affecting power plants. One reason why foreign markets may 
have little influence on innovation in the electricity sector, as opposed 
to the automotive industry, is that electricity is not a traded commodity. 
Moreover, the bulk of emissions control equipment used in these 
countries comes from domestic suppliers. 
Adaptive R&D seems to be necessary to suit the technology to the  •
local market in developing countries.
Popp finds evidence of innovation even in countries that adopt 
regulations late, suggesting that these countries do not simply take 
advantage of technologies “off the shelf” that have been developed 
elsewhere. Instead, late adopters often undertake adaptive R&D 
to fit the technology to local markets. As evidence, Popp finds that 
these later patents are more likely to cite earlier foreign rather than 
domestic inventions. Lanjouw and Mody find similar evidence that 
the environmentally friendly innovations that do occur in developing 
countries are smaller inventive steps, typically done to modify existing 
technologies to local conditions. Foreign knowledge serves as blueprints 
for further improvements, rather than as a direct source of technology. 
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When policymakers consider the potential for technological change 
to reduce climate emissions in developing countries, they must make 
allowances for adaptive R&D to fit technologies to local conditions, 
or else be prepared for less than desired results when the transferred 
technology is not a perfect fit for the local market.
Binding emissions constraints in developing countries will not be  •
necessary to encourage the invention and innovation of technologies 
that reduce carbon emissions.
Policies in developed countries encourage innovation of emissions-
reducing technologies. For example, patenting activity for renewable 
energy technologies, measured by applications for renewable energy 
patents submitted to the European Patent Office (EPO), has increased 
dramatically in recent years, as both national policies and international 
efforts to combat climate change begin to provide incentives for 
innovation (Johnstone et al. 2008). Similarly, increased energy prices 
that accompany a carbon tax or emissions trading scheme have led to 
innovation in both energy efficiency and alternative energy sources (Popp 
2002). As a result, technologies to help reduce emissions in developing 
countries are available for adoption.
Transfer of Environmentally Friendly Technologies
As innovation of technologies to reduce GHGs is already underway 
in developed countries, the key question for developing countries 
is one of technology transfer. The current availability of cleaner 
technologies offers developing countries a chance to leapfrog over 
developed economies by adopting them before more serious harm 
occurs (see Dasgupta et al. 2002). For instance, China’s 2006 Report 
on the State of the Environment declares scientific innovation the key 
to “historic transformation of environmental protection” and “leap-frog 
development.” As an example of this, when China imposed their first fuel 
economy regulations on passenger vehicles in 2004, the standards were 
more stringent than those in place in the United States (Bradsher 2004). 
However, as discussed below, it is still important for proper incentives to 
be in place for these transfers to occur. 
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What is Technology Transfer?
There is no one universally accepted definition of technology transfer. 
Pertaining to climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) defines technology transfer as:
a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, 
experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting 
to climate change amongst different stakeholders 
such as governments, private sector entities, financial 
institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and research/education institutions. (IPCC 2000, quoted 
in Seres et al. 2007) 
The benefits of the transfer to the recipient developing country, and 
thus the potential for technology transfer to improve well-being in the 
recipient country, depend on the type of transfer. 
Embodied technology transfer comes through the importation of 
equipment into a country (e.g., flows of equipment). In such cases, the 
technology is embodied in the imported equipment.
Disembodied technology transfer involves the flow of know-how or 
experience. Examples include demonstration projects, training local staff, 
and local firms hiring away staff from multinational firms operating in a 
developing country. 
The benefits of each type of technology transfer are best illustrated by 
the old Chinese proverb: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a 
day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” The use of 
advanced equipment imported into the country (embodied technology 
transfer) may make the recipient country more productive, just as eating 
fish received as a handout may make the recipient less hungry. However, 
such transfers do not necessarily give the recipient country the ability 
to replicate the technology on their own. In contrast, just as teaching 
a man to fish enables the learner to provide for himself, disembodied 
technology transfers enable the recipient to develop skills that can be 
used in later projects initiated by the recipient country. 
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At the same time, disembodied technology transfers are a concern 
for private firms because they result in knowledge spillovers, or the 
unintentional transmission of knowledge beyond the boundaries of the 
firm. For instance, multinational corporations (MNCs) often go to great 
lengths to keep local workers from leaving their firm to work for a local 
company, in order to prevent knowledge from falling into a competitor’s 
hands. These corporations often pay higher wages than local firms to 
give workers an incentive to stay.
Sources of Technology Transfer
Public funding of technology transfer includes aid from governments or 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), typically in the form of official 
developmental assistance (ODA). Compared to private investment, 
ODA flows are small, but they are important in areas of the world 
that receive little foreign investment (Gupta et al. 2007). In the case 
of climate change, such aid often involves international cooperation. 
For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and World Bank jointly 
implement the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which provides 
grants for developing country projects to protect the global environment. 
Although not devoted specifically to climate change, biodiversity and 
climate change are the two most important categories funded by GEF. 
Since 1991, GEF has invested almost $2 billion for climate change, of 
which 90 percent has gone to energy efficiency, renewable energy, GHG 
reduction, or sustainable transportation (de Coninck et al. 2008). 
Private firms transfer technology to developing countries in three ways. 
Trade. A developing country may acquire new technology via 
international trade, with the technology embodied in the good being 
traded. Trade is an increasingly important source of new technologies; 
the share of GDP attributed to imported high-tech products has grown 
by over 50 percent in low-income countries, and by over 70 percent in 
middle-income countries, since 1994 (World Bank 2008). 
Spillovers are possible through trade, depending on the absorptive 
capacity of the country. Absorptive capacity describes the recipient 
country’s ability to do research to understand, implement, and adapt 
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technologies arriving in the country. Absorptive capacity influences 
the speed at which a newly arriving technology diffuses through a 
developing country. It depends on the technological literacy and skills of 
the workforce, and is influenced by education, the strength of governing 
institutions, and financial markets (see World Bank 2008 for a discussion 
of the role of absorptive capacity in technology transfer).
Foreign Direct Investment. Using foreign direct investment (FDI), a 
multinational corporation (MNC) establishes a subsidiary in the recipient 
country and makes use of advanced technology in the subsidiary. FDI 
flows into developing countries rose from $10 billion in 1980 to $390 
billion in 2007 (World Bank 2008). 
The beneficiary of technology transfer through FDI varies. In some 
cases, the MNC may reap the rewards of using the new technology (e.g., 
via enhanced productivity and greater profits). In other cases, local firms 
may learn about the technology (e.g., through workers who leave the 
MNC to work at a locally-owned company). In such cases, spillovers 
occur and the developing country’s technological base is enhanced. 
However, empirical studies on FDI in developing countries find little 
evidence of technological spillovers from FDI (Saggi 2000, Keller 
2004). Once again, absorptive capacity is important, as spillovers are 
most likely when the difference in technological sophistication between 
countries is not large (World Bank 2008).
License to a Local Firm. A multinational firm may instead choose to 
license its technology to a firm in the recipient country. Developing 
countries paid $22 billion in licensing fees in 2006, which, as a 
percentage of developing country GDP, represents a five-fold increase 
between 1999 and 2006 (World Bank 2006). Licensing allows the MNC 
to avoid potential trade barriers when sending technology abroad, and to 
gain entry to countries where they are uncertain about local markets or 
customs. However, depending on the terms of the licensing agreement, 
the MNC may give up some control over the technology. The strength 
of intellectual property rights is important here, as stronger intellectual 
property rights make it easier for the MNC to protect its technology and 
thus more willing to license it. At the same time, stronger intellectual 
property rights make spillovers to developing countries less likely.
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Because firms become less concerned with technology leaking out as an 
innovation becomes older, firms tend to choose FDI to transfer newer 
technologies and licensing to transfer older technologies that are no 
longer cutting edge (Mansfield and Romeo 1980).
Incentives to Transfer Climate-Friendly Technology
Given these pathways for technology transfer, it is important to consider 
the incentives that exist for adopting climate-friendly technology. 
These depend on the nature of the technology and the extent to which 
environmental externalities are corrected by environmental policy. 
Energy efficient innovations diffuse even without environmental  •
policy.
First, consider emissions reductions achieved using energy efficient 
technologies. Private firms have incentives to make such investments 
even without climate policy in place, as reducing energy consumption 
provides cost savings to the firm. For example, Fisher-Vanden et al. 
(2006) studied energy consumption at 22,000 Chinese large and medium 
enterprises, and found that total energy use fell by 17 percent between 
1997 and 1999. About half of this decline can be explained by price 
changes. Technological change, measured by firm-level R&D, accounted 
for 17 percent of this change, and changes in ownership accounted for 
another 12 percent. 
They also found that a firm’s in-house technological activities are 
important for creating absorptive capacity needed for successful 
diffusion of imported technology. That is, local firms are more likely 
to successfully transfer technology from abroad if they are actively 
involved in R&D themselves. Similarly, Fisher-Vanden (2003) studied 
the diffusion of continuous casting technology for steel production at 75 
Chinese steel firms. The use of continuous casting has important energy 
implications, as it uses 70 percent less energy than ingot casting. Fisher-
Vanden found that while centrally managed firms are the first to acquire 
new technology, locally managed firms complete the integration of the 
technology throughout the firm more rapidly. 
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As both these studies illustrate, energy efficient technologies will 
diffuse to developing countries even without the aid of policy, as firms 
(particularly privately owned, profit maximizing firms) look to lower 
production costs. Since 1980, energy intensity, defined as energy 
consumption per dollar of GDP, has fallen at a rate of nearly 4 percent 
per year in China. Worldwide, energy intensity has fallen at a rate of 
1.5 percent per year since 1995 (Energy Information Administration 
n.d.). However, without policies limiting carbon emissions, firms 
will underinvest in energy efficient technologies, as the additional 
environmental benefits achieved by these technologies do not enhance 
the firm’s bottom line. 
Without environmental policy, firms do not have incentives to  •
adopt costly technologies that reduce emissions but provide no 
additional cost savings to the firm.
In other cases, reducing emissions requires firms to take costly actions 
that provide no direct benefits to the firm itself. Examples of such 
technologies for climate change include clean energy sources such as 
wind and solar, which produce no carbon emissions but cost more than 
fossil-fuel based energy sources; capture of methane gas from landfills; 
and carbon sequestration from power plants. 
Because most policies reducing carbon emissions are only a few years 
old, little evidence of the effect of these polices on technology diffusion 
exists. Instead, we can draw analogies from the study of older air 
pollution technologies. For instance, since regulations limiting particulate 
matter (PM) were enacted several years before regulations covering 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOX), most power plants in 
China have controls for particulate matter, while only the newest plants 
control NOX and SO2 (Lovely and Popp 2008). Similarly, Gallagher 
studies joint ventures between US and Chinese automobile firms. 
All of them transfer environmental technology to China, but it is not 
advanced. In most cases, emissions control technologies used in autos 
in China comply with older Euro II standards, which are required for 
Beijing and Shanghai, but would not meet developed country standards. 
Gallagher notes that “(t)he main reason cleaner and more energy-efficient 
technologies were not transferred is that there simply were no compelling 
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policy incentives for the US firms to do so, and the foreign firms did not 
voluntarily transfer better technologies” (2006, p. 387).
Because most pollution control technologies are first developed in 
industrialized countries, and because environmental regulations are 
needed to provide incentives to adopt these technologies, adoption 
of regulation is a key first step in the diffusion of climate-friendly 
technologies. While the adoption of pollution control technologies within 
a country responds quickly to environmental regulation, adoption of the 
regulations themselves follows the typical S-shaped pattern noted in 
studies of technology diffusion, in which a few early adopters, typically 
technology leaders, are followed by a period of more rapid adoption. A 
period of slower adoption by the remaining stragglers follows.
As pollution control technologies improve, the costs of abatement,  •
and thus the costs of adopting environmental regulation, fall. Over 
time, countries adopt environmental regulation at lower levels of per 
capita income.
Lovely and Popp (2008) studied the adoption of regulations limiting 
emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides at coal-fired electric 
power plants in 39 countries, both developed and developing, 
concentrating on the period 1980 to 2000, focusing on access to 
technology as an important factor influencing regulatory adoption. As 
pollution control technologies improve, the costs of abatement, and 
thus the costs of adopting environmental regulation, fall. As a result, 
over time, countries adopt environmental regulation at lower levels 
of per capita income. Figure 1 illustrates this trend for the adoption of 
SO2 emission regulations. The figure shows per capita GDP, measured 
in 1995 US dollars, in the year of adoption of SO2 regulations for each 
of the 39 countries included in their study. Along the horizontal axis, 
countries are sorted by the year in which they adopted. The figure is 
divided into three segments. The first segment includes 6 countries that 
adopted before 1980, the first year of data in their analysis. With the 
exception of the Philippines, each of these countries adopted at a per 
capita income roughly between $15,000 and $20,000. Early adoption of 
regulation in the Philippines is explained by close bilateral relations with 
the United States, which includes aid for environmental protection.
David Popp
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Of the countries adopting SO2 regulations between 1980-2000, there 
is a strong trend of countries adopting at lower incomes over time. 
Lovely and Popp interpreted this trend as showing how the availability 
of technologies, produced by countries that first chose to adopt SO2 
regulations, lowered adoption costs sufficiently for more countries to be 
able to afford reducing SO2 emissions. Moreover, they found countries 
that are more open to international trade gain access to new abatement 
technologies sooner, and thus are able to regulate SO2 emissions sooner. 
Finally, the third segment of Figure 1 includes countries that have yet 
to adopt SO2 regulations. Except for Australia and New Zealand, which 
choose to not regulate SO2 emissions because the coal found in these 
countries is generally low in sulfur, these are all low-income countries 
(Soud 1991, McConville 1997).
Hilton (2001) also found that late adopters of regulation can learn from 
early adopters. Using data on 48 nations, he looked at the time it took 
each country to eliminate lead from fuel, measuring from the date that 
each country first began phasing out lead in fuel to the date on which the 
country achieved lead levels at or below 0.5 grams of lead per gallon. 
Countries that began the process after 1979 completed the lead phase-
out five years faster, on average, than those beginning before 1979. 
Even among countries that did not completely phase out lead, those that 
began the phase-out process earlier achieved greater reductions. Hilton 
concluded that late adopters are able to move more quickly because they 
benefit from lessons learned by early adopters.
Both these studies suggest that advances in technology within developed 
countries can shorten the time by which developing countries agree to 
binding emissions reductions. When considering environmental policy, 
countries weigh the benefits of a cleaner environment against the costs of 
complying with the regulation. Technological advances lower the cost of 
compliance, making regulation more likely. 
Applications to Climate Change
Politicians continue to express concerns over non-participation of 
developing countries, but this is no different from the path taken for other 
environmental regulations. Developed countries have traditionally acted 
first, after which the resulting technological innovations made it easier 
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for developing countries to adopt regulations at a later date. There is no 
reason to expect climate policy to be any different. 
However, climate policy is complicated by the fact that GHG emissions 
reductions are a public good—they benefit everyone, not just the local 
citizenry. Given this, it is less likely that developing countries will move 
as quickly to regulate CO2 emissions as they did in the cases of SO2, 
NOX, and lead. Moreover, developing countries are more likely to accept 
moderate emissions reductions that could be met by improved efficiency 
(such as China’s climate strategy discussed in the introduction), as the 
adoption of energy efficiency technologies provides secondary benefits to 
these countries. 
Technological change can also help alleviate the problem of incomplete 
participation in climate treaties. The standard presumption is that when 
only some countries commit to reducing carbon emissions, high-carbon 
industries will migrate to non-participating countries, resulting in carbon 
leakage, an increase in CO2 emissions in the non-participating countries 
in reaction to the reduction in emissions by the more strictly regulated 
countries. Golombek and Hoel (2004) noted that, in the countries 
committed to carbon reductions, induced technological change will lower 
abatement costs, which may be sufficient to encourage non-participating 
countries to reduce their carbon emissions as well. Golombek and Hoel 
also found the level of environmental R&D in the non-participating 
country to be important. If the non-participating country is already 
performing environmental R&D, increases in environmental R&D in 
the participating country may crowd out R&D in the non-participating 
country, mitigating the benefits of spillovers. However, if the non-
participating country was not doing environmental R&D, as is the case in 
most developing countries, spillovers will lead to lower emissions. This 
work is theoretical in nature, and suggests directions for future research. 
In particular, estimating the magnitude of each effect (technology transfer 
vs. leakage) would help policymakers better understand the risks (or lack 
thereof) of incomplete participation. 
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The Clean Development Mechanism and Technology 
Transfer
As the previous discussion shows, the transfer of clean technologies 
to developing countries is important if the growth of carbon emissions 
from these countries is to be contained. However, with the exception of 
some energy efficiency technologies, clean technologies typically do 
not flow across borders unless environmental policies in the recipient 
country provide incentives to adopt clean technology. Given the need for 
continued economic development, developing countries are unlikely to 
enact policies requiring binding emissions reductions at this time.
Instead, incentives for these technology flows come from the Clean 
Development Mechanism, which allows developed countries to 
meet their own emissions reduction limits by sponsoring projects 
in developing countries. This section draws on our discussion of 
international diffusion of environmental technologies to consider the 
implications of this research for the design and impact of policies such as 
the CDM. 
CDM provides the regulatory incentive to undertake emissions reducing 
activities in developing countries that do not provide the user with 
private costs savings, such as lower energy costs. Capturing landfill gas 
is an example of an emissions mitigation project that would not occur 
without regulation. CDM also increases the profitability of investing in 
projects with some private gain, such as improving energy efficiency. 
Without CDM, firms can reap the benefits of lower energy costs from 
such investments, but they are not rewarded for the environmental 
benefits of reduced carbon emissions.
The Kyoto Protocol states two purposes for the CDM: to help developed 
countries meet emissions reductions obligations and to help developing 
countries achieve sustainable development (Kyoto Protocol, Article 12.2, 
1997). We discuss the role technology transfer plays for each of these 
goals below.
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Does CDM Produce Real Emissions Reductions?
For CDM to achieve real emissions reductions, CDM projects must 
achieve reductions that could not have occurred without the project 
taking place. Approved projects should meet three criteria, according to 
Article 12.5 of the Kyoto Protocol.
Participation should be voluntary, and be approved by each party 1. 
involved. 
The project should deliver “real, measurable, and long-term benefits 2. 
related to the mitigation of climate change.”
Reductions must be “additional to any that would occur in the 3. 
absence of the certified project activity.”
This last criterion, known as additionality, has received the bulk of 
attention from analysts (see Gupta et al. 2007). Less attention has been 
paid to the prospect of long-term benefits. However, the two concepts are 
related.
For a project to be registered (and therefore approved) by the CDM 
Executive Board, the applicant must establish additionality of the 
emissions reductions. Typically, concerns about additionality focus on 
current costs and benefits. The UNFCCC (2008) has approved several 
methodological frameworks for assessing the additionality of proposed 
CDM projects (http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/
approved.html). The basic methodology includes four steps:
Identify alternative scenarios1. : What other options are available to 
project participants? Do these alternatives comply with local regulations? 
Barrier analysis2. : Are there barriers to implementing the alternative 
scenarios? If so, they are not viable alternatives. Are there barriers 
to completing the proposed CDM project that the project design 
overcomes?
Investment analysis3. : Is the baseline scenario a better financial 
investment than the proposed CDM project? 
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Common practice analysis4. : Is the proposed project currently common 
practice in the area? If so, the emissions reductions are not additional.
To see the link between additionality and long-term benefits, note that 
CDM project credits extend for several years. Registered projects have 
a lifespan of 7 or 10 years. According to the CDM Pipeline of approved 
and potential CDM projects (http://cd4cdm.org/), as of April 2008, 
496 of the 978 registered projects had a project length of 10 years, 
and 481 had a project length of 7 years. (In addition, one reforestation 
project in China has a project length of 30 years.) As discussed above, 
environmental technologies have been diffusing to developing countries 
even without the aid of the Clean Development Mechanism. Given 
that diffusion is a gradual process, and that CDM credits are valid for 
multiple years, it is important to ask not only whether a proposed CDM 
project would be feasible today if credits were not available, but also 
whether the proposed project would be feasible during later years of the 
credit’s lifetime. Carbon emissions are cumulative—that is, they persist 
in the atmosphere for hundreds of years. If the project would not be 
viable today, but would be viable in three years time, the CDM credit is 
not truly reducing global carbon concentrations, but is simply hastening 
the reduction of emissions by three years. At most, it is only these three 
years of reduction that are truly additional.
How Might Considerations of Long-Term Benefits Affect Additionality?
First, when determining baseline emissions, the UNFCCC considers 
continuing the current practice, and then adopting the proposed 
technology at a later date. However, no guidelines are provided for 
determining what might be adopted at a later date. The lessons from 
studies of earlier technological diffusion provide a useful guideline. 
In the case of energy efficiency improvements, private actors have 
incentives to adopt technology even without additional regulatory 
pressure, so as to lower energy bills. Energy savings are more valuable 
when energy prices are higher. In this vein, projects that claim credit 
for improving energy efficiency should be viewed skeptically in a time 
of rising energy prices. Even if such projects are not currently common 
practice, one would expect these technologies to diffuse with or without 
the aid of a CDM project. For example, Fisher-Vanden et al. (2006) 
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found that, from 1997-1999, both imported and locally developed 
technologies in China improved energy efficiency. 
Some wind power projects may also be viable without CDM support. 
The general manager of one wind project in China reports that  
“(w)ithout the Clean Development Mechanism, we’d still be 
profitable…. (But, we) need the C.D.M. for further expansion” (Bradsher 
2007). This is particularly true in areas where the large infrastructure of 
a traditional fossil-fueled power plant may not be feasible. In contrast, 
projects without private benefits, such as the capturing of landfill gasses, 
would be unlikely to occur without CDM support.
Second, consider the criterion of common practice. What is common 
practice for multinational firms may not be common practice for local 
firms. Looking at variations in FDI and environmental regulations 
across Chinese provinces, Dean et al. (2008) found that FDI investment 
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan is attracted to provinces with 
weaker environmental regulation, while FDI from OECD nations is 
not attracted. Technological differences are important here—OECD 
multinationals use cleaner technologies elsewhere, and do not necessarily 
choose to modify their production processes to pollute more when 
investing abroad. Multinationals are usually the first to bring new 
environmental technologies to a country (see, for example, Dasgupta et 
al. 2002). In many cases, it is easier for a multinational firm to use the 
same equipment and processes that it uses at home, rather than develop 
a dirtier process for use in developing countries. Thus, the proper 
evaluation for a CDM project located at a multinational corporation 
(MNC) subsidiary should ask whether it is common practice for the 
MNC, rather than whether it is common practice in the host country.
Can CDM Help Developing Countries Achieve Sustainable 
Development?
By transferring technology to the host country, the Clean Development 
Mechanism can help lower a developing country’s costs of eventual 
compliance with global climate treaties, and increase the likelihood 
that developing countries will agree to binding emissions reductions 
at a later date. While language in the Kyoto Protocol encourages the 
transfer of climate-friendly technologies, the Clean Development 
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Mechanism was not explicitly designed with technology transfer in mind. 
Nonetheless, the potential for technology transfer is an important part 
of any evaluation of the CDM, particularly when evaluating the long-
term benefits that may accrue. Projects that lead to knowledge spillovers 
through disembodied technology transfer reduce the future costs of 
lowering emissions. Thus, an important question for evaluating the CDM 
is whether it encourages projects that include a transfer of knowledge, as 
opposed to simply a transfer of equipment. Interestingly, the importance 
of knowledge spillovers is overlooked in many analyses of CDM’s 
impact on sustainable development. Instead, the focus is on broader goals 
such as poverty reduction, increased employment, and improvement of 
local environmental conditions (see, for example, Sutter and Parreño, 
2007).
Related to technology transfer is a concern often raised by critics of 
CDM—the problem of “low-hanging fruit” and diminishing returns 
(e.g., Narain and van’t Velt 2008, note 1). Consider the example of 
trying to reduce energy consumption in your own home. The first steps 
you can take are straightforward and virtually costless—turning off 
lights when not in use, lowering the thermostat, and installing compact 
fluorescent light bulbs. Further reductions in energy consumption, 
such as replacing older appliances with newer energy efficient models 
and adding more insulation, would cost much more. Similarly, when 
considering emissions reductions in a country, the easiest, least expensive 
projects will probably be done first. To the extent that CDM projects do 
not involve technology transfer, but rather a developed country investor 
acting unilaterally, the low cost options will be used first, making future 
emissions reductions more costly. The recipient developing countries will 
be worse off when they try to reduce emissions on their own, and less 
willing to agree to binding emissions reductions at a later date.
However, technological change can counteract the impact of diminishing 
returns. While the costs of additional emissions reductions at a given 
time increase as more projects are completed, the arrival of new 
technologies may reduce the future cost of reducing emissions. As noted 
earlier, the advancement of climate policies in developed countries 
can be expected to further lower these costs, even without emissions 
reduction commitments from developing countries. As these technologies 
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become available in developing countries, the costs of emissions 
reductions will fall, at least partially offsetting the low-hanging fruit 
problem. For CDM to contribute to these falling costs, it is important that 
projects (a) include a component of technology transfer, and (b) that this 
transfer include disembodied knowledge, so that the benefits spill over 
into the economy as a whole. Designing CDM policy to encourage such 
transfers reduces the likelihood that the low-hanging fruit problem will 
arise.
Encouraging Technology Transfer within CDM
CDM is an important source of aid to developing countries, providing 
more resources than the Global Environmental Facility. However, CDM 
investments are small compared to private flows of FDI (Gupta et al. 
2007, referencing Ellis et al. 2007). Most CDM projects have taken place 
in China. 
In the early years of CDM trading, reducing trifluoromethane (HFC-23) 
emissions dominated CDM projects. HFC-23 is a powerful greenhouse 
gas with a global warming potential (GWP) equivalent to 11,700 tons of 
CO2. HFC-23 is cheap to eliminate, and its use is already prohibited in 
developed countries as a result of the Montreal Protocol (The Economist 
2007). Even in developing countries, many of these HFC-23 reductions 
are likely to have occurred even without the aid of developed countries. 
The cost of eliminating HFC-23 is so low that firms producing the gas 
make more money from selling CDM credits than they do by selling 
the gas themselves (Wara 2007). To avoid the possibility of new firms 
entering the HFC-23 market simply to sell CDM credits, the United 
Nations no longer allows CDM credits to be sold to new HFC-23 
producers (The Economist 2008). 
Projects to eliminate HFC-23 are an example of equipment transfers that 
may eliminate low-hanging fruit, but do not enhance the technical ability 
of the recipient country. As opportunities for further HFC-23 reductions 
are few, the focus of CDM reductions changed in 2007 to clean energy 
projects, such as renewable energy, fuel switching, and energy efficiency 
(Capoor and Ambrosi 2008), where the potential for transfer of 
knowledge exists, depending on how the project is set up. 
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While the CDM language in the Kyoto Protocol does not require 
technology transfer, individual host countries can take action to 
encourage technology transfer. CDM projects must be approved by 
the host country’s government. Some countries choose to evaluate the 
technology transfer potential of projects when considering approval. 
For example, South Korea requires that “environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how shall be transferred” by CDM projects in 
Korea (Lee 2006, quoted in Haites et al. 2006). As a result, 88 percent of 
the emissions reductions from CDM projects in South Korea come from 
projects that involve technology transfer. Similarly, Chinese guidelines 
for CDM project approval state that “CDM project activities should 
promote the transfer of environmentally sound technology to China” 
(China 2005, quoted in Haites et al. 2006). While this is not mandatory, 
75 percent of CDM emissions reductions in China come from projects 
that transfer technology. 
In contrast, the percentage of reductions coming from projects with 
technology transfer is lower in countries that do not specifically consider 
technology transfer when approving CDM projects, such as Brazil or 
India (Haites et al. 2006).
How might policy encourage CDM projects with a technology transfer 
component? Dechezleprêtre et al. (2008) looked at 644 CDM projects 
registered by the Executive Board of the UNFCCC to determine how 
many projects transferred “hardware,” such as equipment or machinery, 
as opposed to “software,” that is, knowledge, skills, or know-how. In 
other words, how often did these CDM projects transfer knowledge and 
skills that not only allow a developed country investor to meet emissions 
reduction credits, but also enable the recipient developing country to 
make continual improvements to their own emission levels? 
Dechezleprêtre et al. found that 43 percent of the projects (279), involve 
technology transfer. However, these projects are among the most 
significant CDM projects, as they account for 84% of the expected 
emissions reductions from registered CDM projects. Of these, 57 
transferred equipment, 101 transferred knowledge, and 121 transferred 
both equipment and knowledge. The percentage of projects involving 
technology transfer varied depending on the type of technology used 
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in the project. For instance, all projects reducing HFC-23 involved 
solely a transfer of equipment. Most projects reducing nitrous oxide and 
recovering methane also involved equipment transfer, as did renewable 
energy projects such as wind and solar. In contrast, energy efficiency 
measures were less likely to include technology transfer, offering 
another reason for viewing CDM projects promoting energy efficiency 
skeptically. Technology transfer also varied by recipient country. Just 
12 percent of the projects studied in India included technology transfer, 
compared to 40 percent in Brazil and 59 percent in China.
The authors found that a project is more likely to include technology 
transfer if it is larger, if the project developer is a subsidiary of a 
company in a developed country, and if the project includes one or 
more carbon credit buyers. Before credits for a project can be sold, the 
emission reductions must be certified. Because they have an interest in 
obtaining emission credits, credit buyers help to facilitate this process. 
Similar to Lovely and Popp (2008), they also found that trade policy is 
important. Technology transfer is more likely if the country is more open 
to trade. 
The technological capacity of a country also enhances technology 
transfer, as it makes the recipient better able to absorb new knowledge. 
This result is sector specific, however, and is only important in the 
energy and chemical industries. Interestingly, in the case of agriculture, 
technological capacity reduces the likelihood of technology transfer. 
Much R&D activity in developing countries focuses on agriculture. 
As such, countries with greater technological capacity are better able 
to develop their own innovations in agriculture, reducing the need for 
technology transfer from abroad. 
Technology transfer is less likely if there are other similar projects in the 
country. These results suggest that the needs of the host country should 
be considered when certifying (or choosing not to certify) CDM projects. 
They also suggest that more general policies designed to improve 
absorptive capacity in a country enhance the prospects for technology 
transfer. Offering assistance in the development of absorptive capacity, 
such as training for environmental engineers in developing countries, 
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could be a useful bargaining chip for developed countries in the next 
round of climate negotiations.
Conclusions
As the economies of developing countries grow, greenhouse gas 
emissions from these countries will continue to rise. Curtailing growth 
in these countries is not a viable alternative. The diffusion of clean 
technologies will play a vital part in any climate stabilization strategy. 
This study reviews the literature on transfer of environmentally-friendly 
technologies and discusses how the lessons from this research can inform 
climate policy. 
A key point is that technology diffusion is gradual. The process of 
diffusion of climate friendly technologies and policies in developing 
countries is no different from what has already occurred with other 
environmental policies, such as for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions and 
leaded gasoline. Early adoption of policy by developed countries leads to 
the development of new technologies that make it easier for developing 
countries to reduce pollution as well. Some technologies, such as those 
that enhance energy efficiency, will diffuse to developing countries 
even without the aid of policy prescriptions such as the CDM. This is 
important for assessing the potential emissions reductions of proposed 
CDM projects.
While often frowned upon by environmental advocates, globalization, 
that is, the opening up of economies to international competition, plays 
an important role in moving clean technologies to developing countries. 
Clean technologies are first developed in the world’s leading economies, 
and developing countries gain access to them through international trade 
and foreign investments. These countries then adopt environmental 
regulations more quickly than they otherwise would.
Finally, the absorptive capacity of nations is important. The technological 
skills of the local workforce enable a country to learn from, and build 
upon, technologies brought in from abroad. 
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Design and Implementation of Future CDM Projects
Better understanding of the rates of diffusion •
The gradual, dynamic nature of diffusion also has important implications 
for the design and implementation of future CDM projects. We cannot 
predict which countries would still gain access to which technologies 
without CDM projects. We need to develop evidence and methodologies 
to predict whether a proposed technology would be likely to diffuse to 
a country during the life of a CDM project, even if the project did not 
take place. A recent World Bank report (2008) finds evidence that newer 
technologies are moving to developing countries at faster rates than 
in the past. However, there is little evidence on the speed of diffusion 
of climate-friendly technologies. As knowing the speed of diffusion is 
important for policy implementation, such studies are a promising topic 
for future research. Such a research agenda could focus on global rates 
of diffusion, as well as the behavior of multinational corporations in 
other developing countries. Intuitively, the key is to be able to determine 
whether the technology proposed in a CDM project application is about 
to diffuse to the country anyway—for example, is it already appearing in 
countries that are similar but only slightly more advanced? Such criteria 
would help ensure that CDM projects not only assist developed countries 
in meeting emission reduction requirements, but also aid developing 
countries through knowledge spillovers from technology transfer. 
Designing CDM to encourage knowledge spillovers. •
Finally, as the world prepares for a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, an 
important question is whether CDM can be enhanced more generally 
to encourage technology transfer. The current CDM addresses the 
environmental externality market failure by providing investors with an 
opportunity to profit from climate-friendly investments in developing 
countries. However, CDM does not address market failures resulting 
from the public goods nature of knowledge (see, for example, Driesen 
2008). Increased attention to the long-term development implications 
of CDM technology transfer would be consistent with the sustainable 
development goals of CDM. 
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Encouraging such spillovers will be challenging. Policymakers could 
simply choose to withhold approval for CDM projects that do not result 
in knowledge spillovers. However, doing so without compensating 
firms for these spillovers would lower the interest of developed country 
investors in CDM projects. While projects unlikely to contribute 
knowledge spillovers would be reduced, there is no guarantee that such a 
policy would actually increase projects with knowledge spillovers. 
To increase the spillovers resulting from CDM projects, investors 
would need to be compensated for the benefits these spillovers provide. 
Traditional policies for encouraging R&D, such as intellectual property 
rights, are not appropriate, as they work by preventing spillovers 
rather than enhancing them. Instead, subsidies to CDM investors 
would compensate them for the positive social benefits of knowledge 
spillovers. Funding for such subsidies would most likely have to come 
from developed countries. While developed countries may balk at such 
aid, it would not only improve the development prospects of recipient 
countries, but also the likelihood that these recipient countries will agree 
to binding emissions reductions at a later date. 
Appendix. Annex 1 Countries of the Kyoto Protocol
Country Annex 1 OECD
1 Australia ● ●
2 Austria ● ●
3 Belarus ●
4 Belgium ● ●
5 Bulgaria ●
6 Canada ● ●
7 Croatia ●
8 Czech Republic ● ●
9 Denmark ● ●
10 Estonia ●
11 European Community ●
12 Finland ● ●
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13 France ● ●
14 Germany ● ●
15 Greece ● ●
16 Hungary ● ●
17 Iceland ● ●
18 Ireland ● ●
19 Italy ● ●
20 Japan ● ●
21 Korea ●
22 Latvia ●
23 Lichtenstein ●
24 Lithuania ●
25 Luxembourg ● ●
26 Mexico ●
27 Monaco ●
28 Netherlands ● ●
29 New Zealand ● ●
30 Norway ● ●
31 Poland ● ●
32 Portugal ● ●
33 Romania ●
34 Russian Federation ●
35 Slovak Republic/Slovakia ● ●
36 Slovenia ●
37 Spain ● ●
38 Sweden ● ●
39 Switzerland ● ●
40 Turkey ● ●
41 Ukraine ●
42 United Kingdom ● ●
43 United States ● ●
Sources: www.OECD.org; unfccc.int (Kyoto Protocol).
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